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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Before the recent Florida controversy, co-authors of the only two 
election law casebooks drew a distinction between the “big picture” 
issues of election law—such as representation, the nature of political 
equality, the role of money in politics—and the “nuts-and-bolts” of 
election law.1 The conventional wisdom was that the former was 
more important (and no doubt more interesting) to study than the 
latter.2 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A., 
University of California, Berkeley, 1986; M.A. 1988, J.D. 1991, Ph.D. (Political Science) 
1992, University of California, Los Angeles. Thanks to Evan Caminker, Sam Issacharoff, 
Stephen J. Kay, Clark Kelso, Hal Krent, Dan Lowenstein, Bill Marshall, Richard 
McAdams, Andrew Sabel, Paul Schwartz, Georgene Vairo, and symposium participants, 
for useful comments and suggestions and to Caroline Djang for research assistance. The 
author served as an unpaid consultant to the Gore legal team on questions related to the 
Miami-Dade recount. 
 1. The two casebooks are DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION 
LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2001); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF 
DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 2001). 
 2. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not By “Election Law” Alone, 32 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1173, 1173-74 (1999) (objecting to the term “election law” as focusing on “elec-
tions and their administrative mechanisms,” narrowing the field “to microscopic regulatory 
details” and running the risk of “signaling to potential newcomers a tedious focus on the 
narrow regulatory questions of most interest to political junkies . . . .”); Daniel H. Lowen-
stein, Election Law as a Subject—A Subjective Account, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1199, 1202 
(1999) (although “[n]uts and bolts questions . . . have increased in number . . . [f]or the 
most part we do not teach these issues and we do not write about them in law reviews; not 
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 The Florida controversy challenged that conventional wisdom. Al-
though resolution of the dispute depended essentially upon two nuts-
and-bolts questions—how does one determine the intent of the voter 
from examining a paper ballot and what are the mechanics for con-
testing a statewide election?—the controversy illustrated in numer-
ous ways that the line between big picture questions and nuts-and-
bolts questions is fuzzy. Indeed, this nuts-and-bolts dispute raised 
big picture questions regarding the nature of representation, the 
meaning of political equality, and the role of money in politics.3 It is 
no wonder that the new editions of both casebooks include material 
on the Florida dispute.4 
 The Supreme Court’s per curiam (unsigned) majority opinion in 
Bush v. Gore5 eviscerated the distinction between nuts-and-bolts 
questions and big picture questions by holding that Florida law, at 
least as construed by the Florida Supreme Court, violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held 
that a state violates equal protection when it fails to have uniform 
standards for the recounting of votes during a statewide election con-
test.6 The opinion is potentially far-reaching, translating just about 
any disparity regarding the means of voting into a justiciable ques-
tion. Indeed, if Bush v. Gore were already on the books at the time 
the Palm Beach County “butterfly ballot” controversy arose, we could 
have asked how that controversy should have been handled based on 
equal protection grounds.7 
 Part II of this Article argues that although some have heralded 
the opinion as the (perhaps unintended) dawn of a new era in the ju-
risprudence of equal protection in elections, there are good reasons 
for doubting that the Supreme Court majority intended anyone to 
take their equal protection holding seriously. Language in the per 
curiam opinion limits it to the facts of the case, or, at most, to cases 
where jurisdiction-wide recounts are ordered. Moreover, the Court’s 
                                                                                                                    
because they are not there but because, for various reasons, we do not find them suffi-
ciently interesting”). 
 3. Questions of who votes, how votes are counted, and the reasons for and critiques 
of the Electoral College raised questions of representation and political equality. Toward 
the end of the controversy, the media focused on how the presidential candidates raised 
money for recount funds, thereby exploring the relationship of money and politics. On the 
latter issue, see John M. Broder, Contesting the Vote: Many Donors to Campaigns are Fi-
nancing Recount Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2000, at A33. The Center for Responsive Poli-
tics website lists donors to the Gore recount committee and provides a searchable database 
of donors to the Bush recount committee. See http://www.opensecrets.org/alerts/v5/ 
alertv5_65b.asp (Gore); http://www.opensecrets.org/2000elect/other/bush/recountdonors-
form.asp (Bush). 
 4. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 1, chs. 3-4; ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 1, 
chs. 4, 12.  
 5. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 6. Id. at 109. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
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own analysis was superficial. It failed to explain or justify its large 
extension of precedent, and, most importantly, given the fact that a 
“fundamental right” was involved, the Court appeared to speak the 
language of strict scrutiny but apply something much less than strict 
scrutiny. Finally, the kind of equal protection claim favored by the 
conservative Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority is a strong depar-
ture from the usual equal protection jurisprudence they favor. Time 
will tell whether the Court backs away from its ambitious new equal 
protection jurisprudence. To the extent that the Court does back 
away, it further undermines the already-questioned legitimacy of the 
opinion. 
 Part III of this Article considers not whether the Court meant 
what it said, but rather what the consequences would be if the Court 
indeed meant what it said. The equal protection jurisprudence of 
Bush v. Gore moves election law to an uncharted third level of politi-
cal equality. Various amendments to the Constitution and Supreme 
Court cases decided by the Warren Court established the first level of 
equality, requiring that if a jurisdiction holds an election, every citi-
zen, adult resident has the right to vote in that election.8 The Warren 
Court in Reynolds v. Sims9 and its progeny, relying upon the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, established the 
second level of equality—the right to an equally weighted vote.10 In 
Bush v. Gore, the Court relied upon the Reynolds line of cases to 
move to a third level of equality—equality in the procedures and 
mechanisms used for voting. Part III explores a range of election law 
cases that may be subject to a “third level” political equality claim.11 
It concludes that, if the case were taken seriously, Bush v. Gore 
should have great precedential value in changing a host of voting 
procedures and mechanisms, particularly when those procedures and 
mechanisms are challenged prospectively. 
 Part IV of this Article explores the benefits, costs, and implica-
tions of expanding equal protection to such third level claims. The 
benefits of the approach are fairly obvious: a precedent requiring 
scrupulous equality in the holding of elections will increase resources 
used to conduct elections, so that at least twentieth century voting 
technology will be applied as we enter the twenty-first century. It 
will provide a means for those in poor, urban areas to have just as 
accurate a voting system as those used in wealthier areas. It also 
likely will ensure more reliable vote counting.  
                                                                                                                    
 8. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 9. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  
 10. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 11. I ignore the relevance that Bush v. Gore may have for equal protection claims out-
side the election law context. 
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 But expanding political equality to the third level would be a 
mixed blessing. Putting aside the considerable costs associated with 
upgrading voting equipment, rewriting state and local election laws 
involving contested elections, and litigation over both types of 
changes, three concerns arise with extending equal protection juris-
prudence to the nuts-and-bolts of elections. First, third-level claims 
provide a new reason and a pretext for federal courts to nullify state 
and local election results, thereby threatening both democracy and 
the judiciary. Second, third-level claims undermine federalism in a 
way that first- and second-level equal protection claims do not. 
Claims of local control over nuts-and-bolts voting mechanisms reso-
nate more genuinely than claims of localities to deny the franchise to 
certain groups of individuals or to count votes unevenly. Third, third-
level claims create a disincentive for jurisdictions to experiment with 
new methods of voting, such as internet voting. 
 Finally, it is worth thinking about the doctrinal implications of ex-
tending equal protection jurisprudence to the third level. It is unclear 
whether extension of equal protection to the third level differs mean-
ingfully from arguments calling for greater political equality in terms 
of electoral structures (such as Justice Marshall’s argument in his 
dissent in Mobile v. Bolden12) and financing election campaigns (such 
as the arguments of Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz13). The main, 
albeit unintended, precedent of Bush v. Gore may be to ease the way 
for future Supreme Court majorities to pursue their own visions of 
political equality without much thought about whether that vision is 
supported by existing case law.  
II.   WHY WE SHOULD NOT TAKE BUSH V. GORE’S EQUAL PROTECTION 
HOLDING SERIOUSLY 
A.   Optimism and the Equal Protection Holding 
 Two days after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bush v. 
Gore, Professor Sam Issacharoff wrote in a New York Times op-ed of 
the “surprising expansion of voting rights”14 wrought by the opinion: 
[T]he Supreme Court may have given us an advancement in voting 
rights doctrine. It has asserted a new constitutional requirement: 
to avoid disparate and unfair treatment of voters. And this obliga-
tion obviously cannot be limited to the recount process alone. . . . 
                                                                                                                    
 12. 446 U.S. 55, 116-17 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 13. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 273 (1993) [hereinafter Raskin & Bonifaz, Wealth Primary]; Jamin Raskin 
& John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically 
Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 (1994) [hereinafter Raskin & Bonifaz, Consti-
tutional Imperative]. 
 14. Samuel Issacharoff, The Court’s Legacy for Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
2000, at A39.  
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The court’s new standard may create a more robust constitutional 
examination of voting practices.15 
 Echoing Issacharoff’s conclusion that the legacy of the case “could 
be a substantial jolt of justice into the voting arena,”16 Village Voice 
columnist Nat Hentoff concluded that the Justices planned their 
precedent to be far-reaching: “The justices knew that with the way 
opened to election reforms, a lot of cases will be heading to the courts 
throughout the nation until all votes are counted according to uni-
form standards.”17  
 As the Yiddish expression goes, “From your mouth to God’s ears.” 
Whether the sentiments above represent a prediction by Issacharoff 
and Hentoff about the future of equal protection jurisprudence in 
elections or merely wishful thinking, I am far less sanguine that the 
case will have much precedential effect. To explain why, I begin by 
noting precisely what conduct the Bush v. Gore majority opinion held 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.18 
 The Florida election controversy reached the United States Su-
preme Court for the second time in Bush v. Gore, an appeal of the 
Florida Supreme Court’s second opinion.19 In the Florida Supreme 
Court opinion, a four to three majority reversed the trial court. The 
trial court held that Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore failed 
to meet Florida’s statutory requirement to contest the Florida vote 
and therefore rejected Gore’s demand for manual recounts of “under-
votes” in selected Florida counties with large Democratic majorities.20 
“Undervotes” were ballots that vote-counting machines recorded as 
containing no vote for President. Gore asserted that a recount of 
these votes would show enough legally valid votes cast in his favor, 
but not counted by the machine, to make up the extremely small dif-
ference in votes between Gore and Bush. 
                                                                                                                    
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Nat Hentoff, A Jolt of Justice for All Voters: Supreme Court Redeemed, VILLAGE 
VOICE, Jan. 10-16, 2001. For additional optimistic assessments, see Steve France, Equal 
Protection Claims Likely to Prod States to Address Voting System Problems, 69 U.S.L.W. 
2483 (Feb. 20, 2001). 
 18. This analysis assumes the reader is familiar with the facts of the case. As this in-
cident fades into memory, that may no longer be true. Readers looking for more extended 
factual background on the case may consult LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 1, ch. 3; 37 
Days: A Special Report: An American Diary; The Battle Unfolds Day by Day, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2000, at V3. 
 19. The election controversy first came before the Court in Bush v. Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000), rev’g Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. 
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).  
 20. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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 The Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court applied the 
wrong legal standards in judging the merits of Gore’s claim.21 How-
ever, rather than remand the case for the trial court to apply the cor-
rect legal standard to the facts, the Florida Supreme Court ordered 
that certain recounts conducted after the deadline it had set in an 
earlier case should be included in the totals and that recounts of un-
dervotes should go forward.22 And rather than allow Gore to pick the 
counties for the recounts, the Florida court held that all Florida 
counties—and not just the counties singled out by Gore—had to con-
duct manual recounts of the undervotes.23 The court failed to respond 
to Chief Justice Wells’ observation in dissent that it was unfair to 
count only undervotes and not “overvotes”—that is, ballots that the 
vote-counting machines recorded as containing more than one valid 
vote for President.24 
 The court further held that in examining the undervotes to de-
termine if the ballots indeed contained a valid vote for a presidential 
candidate, the counters should judge the ballots using a “clear intent 
of the voter” standard.25 The court failed to be more specific, perhaps 
out of fear that a more specific standard would open up the decision 
to charges that it violated Article II of the United States Constitu-
tion.26 In any case, the court ordered that the trial judge manage the 
statewide recount,27 which needed to be completed in short order.  
                                                                                                                    
 21. Id. at 1252. 
 22. Id. at 1261-62. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1264 n.26 (Wells, C.J., dissenting). It is not clear that all overvotes re-
counted by hand would necessarily be classified as invalid votes. For example, a voter who 
wrote Al Gore’s name in the write-in portion of a ballot and also punched out the chad for 
Al Gore clearly intended to vote for Al Gore, but the counting machine would record that 
vote as an overvote. 
 25. Id. at 1262. 
 26. Article II of the Constitution vests in each state’s legislature the power to pre-
scribe the state’s rules for choosing presidential electors. The Article II issues are beyond 
the scope of this Article. The main thrust of the Article II argument in Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s concurrence is that the Florida Supreme Court’s novel interpretation of legis-
latively enacted statutes regulating election contests in the Bush-Gore dispute constituted 
a change in the law in violation of Article II. On these issues, see James Gardner, The 
Regulatory Role of State Constitutional Structural Constraints in Presidential Elections, 29 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 (2001); Robert Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconceptions of State 
Constitutional Law in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 661 (2001); see also Richard H. 
Pildes, Judging “New Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 691 (2001). Suffice 
it to say that it was clear from the United States Supreme Court’s first opinion in the case, 
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000), that even if the 
Florida Supreme Court thought it was legitimately filling gaps and reconciling conflicting 
statutes in Florida’s election law, it ran the risk of its opinion being characterized as a 
“change of law” in violation of Article II. But cf. Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal 
and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 37 (“That was a gap in the statute that a court applying normal principles of statu-
tory interpretation might fill.”). 
 27. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1262. 
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 The Florida court remanded the case to the original trial judge, 
who recused himself. Another trial judge ordered the manual re-
counts to begin of the Miami-Dade ballots (that had been shipped to 
Tallahassee for the election contest) and in counties across Florida. 
Just as the counts began on Saturday, December 9, the United States 
Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, stayed the Florida Supreme 
Court’s order, thereby suspending the recount.28 Justice Scalia, in his 
opinion concurring to the granting of a stay, explained that a major-
ity of the Court believed that Bush had a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits and stood to face irreparable harm29—the 
Court’s standard for issuing a stay.30 
 Late in the evening of Tuesday, December 12, the Supreme Court 
issued its opinion on the merits. Five Justices (Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas) 
joined in a per curiam opinion reversing the Florida court on equal 
protection grounds.31 The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, issued a concurring opinion presenting as alternative 
grounds for reversal that the Florida Supreme Court’s order violated 
Article II of the Constitution.32 Four Justices dissented (Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens),33 although Justices Breyer 
and Souter expressed some support for the equal protection argu-
ment but not the remedy.34 
                                                                                                                    
 28. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). 
 29. Id. at 1047 (Scalia, J., concurring). I could write much beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle about Justice Scalia’s concurrence, particularly his view of what constituted “irrepa-
rable harm” to Bush and why he failed to balance the equities of harm to Gore from grant-
ing the stay. I note here only that I am aware of no empirical support available at the time 
the Court issued the stay for Justice Scalia’s statement that “it is generally agreed that 
each manual recount produces a degradation of the ballots, which renders a subsequent re-
count inaccurate.” Id. 
 30. Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers). The 
four requirements are: (1) There is a reasonable probability that four Justices will vote to 
grant certiorari or note probable jurisdiction; (2) There is “a fair prospect that a majority of 
the Court will conclude that the decision below was erroneous”; (3) Irreparable harm is 
likely to result from the denial of a stay; and (4) In balancing the equities, taking into ac-
count the harm to both parties as well as the interests of the public at large, the stay 
should be granted. Id. 
 31. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100 (2000). 
 32. Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 33. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 135 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 143 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 34.  
I can conceive of no legitimate state interest served by these differing treat-
ments of the expressions of voters’ fundamental rights. . . . I would . . . remand 
the case to the courts of Florida with instructions to establish uniform stan-
dards for evaluating the several types of ballots that have prompted differing 
treatments, to be applied within and among counties when passing on such 
identical ballots in any further recounting (or successive recounting) that the 
courts might order.  
Id. at 134-35 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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 The per curiam opinion’s analysis began by setting forth the ap-
plicable law. It noted that individual citizens have no federal consti-
tutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United 
States.35 However, “[w]hen the state legislature vests the right to 
vote for President in its people,” as Florida had, “the right to vote as 
the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its 
fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote 
and the equal dignity owed to each voter.”36 The Court continued: 
 The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation 
of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of 
its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, 
the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, 
value one person’s vote over that of another. See, e.g., Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966). . . . It must be 
remembered that “the right of suffrage can be denied by a debase-
ment or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively 
as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).37 
 After noting that “[t]he question before us . . . is whether the re-
count procedures the Florida Supreme Court has adopted are consis-
tent with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of 
the members of its electorate,”38 the Court answered the question in 
the negative. It held that the recount mechanism adopted by the 
Florida Supreme Court did “not satisfy the minimum requirement for 
nonarbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamen-
tal right”39 under the Equal Protection Clause for four related rea-
sons: 
 1. Although the Florida court had instructed that those individu-
als conducting the manual recounts judge ballots by discerning the 
“intent of the voter,” it failed to formulate uniform rules to determine 
such intent, such as whether to count as a valid vote a ballot with a 
chad hanging by two corners. The standards for whether to count a 
                                                                                                                    
I agree that, in these very special circumstances, basic principles of fairness 
should have counseled the adoption of a uniform standard to address the prob-
lem. 
 . . . Nonetheless, there is no justification for the majority’s remedy, which is 
simply to reverse the lower court and halt the recount entirely. An appropriate 
remedy would be, instead, to remand this case with instructions that, even at 
this late date, would permit the Florida Supreme Court to require recounting 
all undercounted votes in Florida . . . and to do so in accordance with a single 
uniform substandard. 
Id. at 146 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id. at 104. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 104-05. 
 38. Id. at 105. 
 39. Id. 
2001]            EQUAL PROTECTION’S FUTURE IN ELECTIONS 385 
 
ballot differed “not only from county to county but indeed within a 
single county from one recount team to another.”40 
 2. The recounts already undertaken included a manual recount of 
all votes in selected counties, including both undervotes and over-
votes, but the new recounts ordered by the Florida court included 
only undervotes.  
 As a result, the citizen whose ballot was not read by a machine 
because he failed to vote for a candidate in a way readable by a 
machine may still have his vote counted in a manual recount; on 
the other hand, the citizen who marks two candidates in a way dis-
cernable by the machine will not have the same opportunity to 
have his vote count, even if a manual examination of the ballot 
would reveal the requisite indicia of intent.41 
 3. The Florida Supreme Court had ordered that the current vote 
totals include results of a partial recount from Miami-Dade County. 
From this fact, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he Florida Su-
preme Court’s decision thus gives no assurance that the recounts in-
cluded in a final certification must be complete.”42 
 4. The Florida Supreme Court did not specify who would count the 
ballots, forcing county boards to include team members without ex-
perience in recounting ballots. Nor were observers permitted to ob-
ject during the recount.43 
 After reaching its holding, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to 
remand the case to the Florida Supreme Court to order procedures 
satisfying these concerns, as two dissenting Justices urged.44 Putting 
aside the Article II problem,45 a remand order would have been en-
tirely manageable.46 Nonetheless, the Court held that the Florida 
Supreme Court had recognized the Florida Legislature’s intention to 
participate fully in the federal electoral process. Under a federal 
                                                                                                                    
 40. Id. at 106. The Court noted that the vote totals already approved by the Florida 
Supreme Court included recount totals from counties using various methods of counting: 
“Broward County used a more forgiving standard than Palm Beach County, and uncovered 
almost three times as many new votes, a result markedly disproportionate to the difference 
in populations between the counties.” Id. at 107. The Court did not respond to Justice Ste-
vens’ point in dissent that concerns about the new recounts “are alleviated—if not elimi-
nated—by the fact that a single impartial magistrate will ultimately adjudicate all objec-
tions arising from the recount process.” Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 108. The Court continued: “Furthermore, the citizen who marks two candi-
dates, only one of which is discernable by the machine, will have his vote counted even 
though it should have been read as an invalid ballot.” Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 109. 
 44. See supra note 34. 
 45. See supra note 26. 
 46. The Court disagreed. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110. The Electoral College did not 
vote until December 18, and Congress did not count the electoral votes until January 6, 
2001. 
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statute,47 states that designate their electors by a certain date, in this 
election by December 12, cannot have their choice challenged in Con-
gress when Congress later counts the electoral votes.  
That date [of December 12] is upon us, and there is no recount pro-
cedure in place under the State Supreme Court’s order that com-
ports with minimal constitutional standards. Because it is evident 
that any recount seeking to meet the December 12 date will be un-
constitutional for the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida . . . .48 
B.   Reasons for Doubting Bush v. Gore’s Precedential Value 
 At first glance, Issacharoff’s and Hentoff’s optimism is entirely 
understandable. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, never before 
had the Supreme Court “called into question the substantive stan-
dard by which a State determines that a vote has been legally cast.”49 
The Court for the first time expressed its willingness to get its hands 
into to the nitty-gritty details of vote counting—one would have been 
hard-pressed before this case to imagine the Supreme Court delving 
into the law of hanging chads. If chads could be questioned, then why 
not a more “robust” exploration of not only the mechanics of elections 
but state and local laws governing election contests as well? And if 
courts are to look at the minutiae of election contests, perhaps courts 
would also consider structural issues, such as the financing of elec-
tions, which might create conditions of inequality among voters. 
Nonetheless, for at least three reasons I doubt this optimistic as-
sessment.  
1.   Limiting Language 
 First, the Court’s language explicitly limiting its holding to the 
facts of this case is extraordinary. After stating the four ways in 
which the Florida procedures violated the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Court wrote: “Our consideration is limited to the present circum-
stances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes gen-
erally presents many complexities.”50 By this statement, the Court 
appeared to dismiss any precedential value this case may have for 
future election law cases.  
 This is a strong deviation from the Court’s usual practice in elec-
tion cases. Take campaign finance for example. When the Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments to the Federal 
                                                                                                                    
 47. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
 48. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110. 
 49. Id. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 109. 
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Election Campaign Act in Buckley v. Valeo,51 the Court, also in a per 
curiam opinion decided under rushed circumstances, resolved excru-
ciatingly difficult and complex issues related to the First Amend-
ment, corruption, political equality, and democracy. Yet the Court 
did not limit the holding in Buckley to the particular facts of the case. 
Far from it; more than twenty-five years after the opinion was is-
sued, the Court continues to look to Buckley as providing the proper 
starting point for evaluating the constitutionality of various cam-
paign finance laws.52 
 Nor was the Court merely silent on the issue of Bush v. Gore’s 
precedential value. It expressly denied the case had any precedential 
value, something the Court could have suggested more subtly in dis-
tinguishing Bush v. Gore’s facts in future cases to come before it. The 
Court further noted that “[t]he question before the Court is not 
whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop 
different systems for implementing elections.”53 When future courts 
consider litigation challenging the electoral practices of local entities, 
no doubt the lawyers representing these entities will point out that 
Bush v. Gore is expressly limited to those situations where “a court 
orders a statewide remedy” and then fails to give “at least some as-
surance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and 
fundamental fairness are satisfied.”54 Following Bush v. Gore, it is 
hard to imagine many cases falling into that category. 
2.   The Court’s Failure to Engage in Serious Analysis 
 Second, we should not take Bush v. Gore’s holding seriously be-
cause the Court itself did not take its holding seriously.55 The per cu-
riam opinion, no doubt, amounted to a great extension of precedent, 
yet the Court never explained why it was extending precedent in this 
case. As authority for its holding, the Court relied principally upon 
two cases, Reynolds v. Sims56 and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
                                                                                                                    
 51. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 52. In one of the most recent of these cases, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397-98 (2000), the Court went out of its way to show how its opinion 
was entirely consistent with Buckley.  
 53. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Judging by the dissents’ focus on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion on 
Article II grounds rather than on equal protection, one wonders if the equal protection 
ground was an afterthought conjured up by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, who may 
have been uncomfortable with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s sharp rebuke of the Florida Su-
preme Court’s reasoning and integrity. See Linda Greenhouse, Bush v. Gore: A Special Re-
port; Election Case a Test and Trauma for Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at A1 
(“[A]lthough intended as a majority opinion, the chief justice’s opinion failed to get the 
support of Justices Kennedy and O’Connor.”). 
 56. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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tions.57 Reynolds held that it is an equal protection violation to elect 
members of a state or local legislative body from unequally populated 
districts.58 According to Reynolds, “[d]iluting the weight of votes be-
cause of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discrimina-
tions based upon factors such as race, or economic status.”59 The 
Reynolds Court took forty pages in the U.S. Reports to justify this 
deviation from past precedent. In Harper, the Court relied upon Rey-
nolds in striking down a poll tax on equal protection grounds: 
“wealth or fee paying has . . . no relation to voting qualifications; the 
right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or 
conditioned.”60  
 Neither case involved the mechanics of elections which had, here-
tofore, been seen to be a matter for local officials. Indeed, the Court 
in recent years has expressed great deference to local officials who 
wish to structure their elections in the way they see fit. In Munro v. 
Socialist Workers Party,61 for example, the Court held that the state 
of Washington’s interest in preventing ballot “confusion” by voters 
justified its rules that kept most third-party candidates off the gen-
eral election ballot. The Court held that the state need not even pro-
vide any empirical evidence that its rules were necessary to prevent 
such confusion:  
 To require States to prove actual voter confusion, ballot 
overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies as a 
predicate to the imposition of reasonable ballot access restrictions 
would invariably lead to endless court battles over the sufficiency 
of the “evidence” marshaled by a State to prove the predicate. Such 
a requirement would necessitate that a State’s political system 
sustain some level of damage before the legislature could take 
corrective action.62 
 That is not to say that the Court was wrong in Bush v. Gore in ex-
tending equal protection to the mechanics of elections. However, even 
under the admittedly great time pressure of the case, the Court could 
have gone a long way toward showing that it took the exercise seri-
ously by including a sentence or two justifying, or at least acknowl-
edging, that the holding greatly expanded past precedent. 
 Perhaps the best evidence that the Court did not take the analysis 
seriously was its resolution of the case. The Court recognized that 
voting is a “fundamental right,” and that “the State may not, by later 
                                                                                                                    
 57. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 58. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583-84. 
 59. Id. at 566 (citations omitted). 
 60. Harper, 383 U.S. at 670. 
 61. 479 U.S. 189 (1986). 
 62. Id. at 195. 
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arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that 
of another.”63 It is hornbook law that laws infringing on fundamental 
rights, including voting, must be judged under the standard of strict 
scrutiny—that is, that the state must have a compelling interest in 
treating voters differently and that the means must be narrowly tai-
lored to meet that interest. The Court did nothing to suggest that 
anything less than strict scrutiny, such as an easier to meet “rational 
basis test,” should apply to analyze burdens on the fundamental 
right of voting in this context.64 
 Nonetheless, the Court held that the Florida Legislature’s interest 
(which the Supreme Court said was recognized by the Florida Su-
preme Court) in taking advantage of the “safe harbor” provisions of 
federal law for counting the state’s electoral votes trumped the rights 
of all Florida voters to have valid votes counted.65 It is not self-
evident that such a state interest was compelling and trumped the 
right, recognized in Reynolds but ignored by the Court in Bush v. 
Gore, to have every vote count: 
It has been repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a 
constitutionally protected right to vote and to have their votes 
counted. In Mosley the Court stated that it is “as equally unques-
tionable that the right to have one’s vote counted is as open to pro-
tection . . . as the right to put a ballot in a box.” The right to vote 
can neither be denied outright, nor destroyed by alteration of bal-
lots, nor diluted by ballot-box stuffing. As the Court stated in Clas-
sic, “Obviously included within the right to choose, secured by the 
Constitution, is the right of qualified voters within a state to cast 
their ballots and have them counted . . . .”66 
 Suppose evidence existed that Florida officials had failed to count 
the votes of African-American voters because of racial animus, and 
the Florida Supreme Court ordered a recount of votes that would re-
quire time beyond December 12, 2000. It is not clear that the “safe 
harbor” provision should have trumped the right to have every vote 
count. Now, perhaps one could argue, even under those circum-
stances, that Florida’s interest in meeting the deadline was indeed 
compelling and that there were no other means to achieve that goal. 
                                                                                                                    
 63. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000). 
 64. It might well be that the Court would have held that the Florida recount proce-
dures flunked even a rational basis test given their “arbitrary” nature. But the Court did 
not say or even suggest that it was relaxing the strict scrutiny it had applied in the past to 
these voting cases. Indeed, Harper and Reynolds, the only cases relied upon by the major-
ity, are among the important cases establishing that strict scrutiny applies to burdens on 
voting. 
 65. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110. 
 66. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964) (emphases added and citations 
omitted). It will not do to argue that the votes were counted in the machine count. Florida 
law, as the law of many other states, allowed for manual recounts of votes precisely be-
cause machines made errors and sometimes failed to count valid votes. 
390  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:377 
 
But the Supreme Court never even bothered to undertake the analy-
sis in Bush v. Gore, suggesting that the fundamental right to vote 
was not so fundamental after all.67 As Judge Posner remarked, 
“[t]here was an air of non sequitur to ruling that the Florida supreme 
court had violated the Constitution by failing to prescribe uniform 
criteria for a recount, yet terminating the recount rather than per-
mitting it to go forward under proper criteria.”68 
3.   Inconsistency in Equal Protection Analysis 
 The final reason not to take the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
holding seriously is that it constitutes a strong break from the con-
servative majority’s usual approach to equal protection and, there-
fore, it will not likely be extended or embraced by them in future 
cases. The argument here is not the “crude” one that “[t]he five Jus-
tices are ‘conservative,’ and ‘conservative’ judges don’t ‘like’ the 
Equal Protection Clause.”69 These Justices have shown that they like 
the Equal Protection Clause just fine, when it is used to pursue 
claims more consistent with their ideology. There was no such thing 
as a claim of an “unconstitutional racial gerrymander” before these 
same five Justices decided Shaw v. Reno70 in 1993, a holding 
grounded in equal protection.71 Shaw and its progeny have been used 
to limit the extent to which race may be taken into account in redis-
tricting to benefit minority-preferred candidates for elective office. 
 It is not so much that these Justices do not “like” equal protection 
as that we would not have expected them to use the Equal Protection 
Clause to create new federal oversight of the minutiae of state and 
local elections. Besides the federalism costs which make the major-
ity’s holding surprising,72 no Rehnquist Court opinion had ever relied 
upon Reynolds or Harper to expand oversight of the electoral process 
or to expand the franchise.73 One would have expected these Justices 
to agree with Judge Posner’s observations about the case: 
                                                                                                                    
 67. Thus, at least under Florida law, those votes were not counted. The Supreme 
Court’s opinion kept these votes uncounted.  Note that this hypothetical situation also ap-
pears to run afoul of the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on abridgement of the right to 
vote on account of race. 
 68. Posner, supra note 26, at 48. 
 69. Id. at 56. 
 70. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 71. The Court, with different personnel, rejected a similar (if not identical) claim in 
1977 in United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). See 
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658 (White, J., dissenting) (“The facts of the case here mirror those in” 
United Jewish Organization). 
 72. I discuss these costs below in Part IV.B. There are significant federalism costs 
with the Shaw line of cases as well. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be 
Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1998). 
 73. When the butterfly ballot case arose, Erwin Chemerinsky and I each independ-
ently suggested that a revote could be demanded under the authority of Reynolds. I made 
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 Such differences [in how votes are counted] had not previously 
been thought to deny equal protection of the laws and if they are 
now to do so this portends an ambitious program of federal judicial 
intervention in the electoral process, a program the Supreme 
Court seems, given the haste with which it acted, to have under-
taken without much forethought about the program’s scope and 
administrability. The last thing we need is more election litiga-
tion.74 
 Judge Posner defended the Supreme Court’s decision not on equal 
protection grounds, which he dismissed in three paragraphs of his 
lengthy article, but instead on grounds of “rough justice,” if not “legal 
justice.”75 “I cannot see the case for precipitating a political and con-
stitutional crisis merely in order to fuss with a statistical tie that, 
given the inherent subjectivity involved in hand counting spoiled bal-
lots, can never be untied.”76 Similarly, Professor Charles Fried, who 
represented the Florida Legislature in an amicus curiae brief before 
the Supreme Court, wrote that the Court’s analysis on why it failed 
to remand the case to the Florida Supreme Court to implement its 
novel equal protection holding was “the least convincing portion of 
the Court’s opinion.”77 
 In sum, the limiting language in the opinion, the lack of serious-
ness with which the Court undertook its own analysis, and the in-
consistency of the opinion with other jurisprudence by this majority 
of Justices all point in the direction of assuming that Bush v. Gore is 
not good precedent for an expansive reading of equal protection law 
in elections. 
 Embarrassment provides the only hope that the case will have 
precedential value. Conservative Justices decided a case in which 
their decision effectively chose a President who was far more likely 
than the losing candidate to choose additional conservative Justices 
                                                                                                                    
my comments on an election law internet discussion group that I manage with Dan 
Lowenstein and to numerous reporters. Chemerinksy made the argument in Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Palm Beach County Must Vote Again, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, at M5. The 
general response to such claims was skepticism given their novelty. Georgene M. Vairo, 
Bush v. Gore, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A16 (“Before the Supreme Court decided Bush 
v. Gore . . . it is likely that only a liberal, results-oriented law professor would have 
thought Mr. Gore would have a prayer in federal court to obtain injunctive relief on . . . 
[equal protection] claims.”). 
 74. Posner, supra note 26, at 41. Posner then argues that a due process claim would 
have been more defensible. “Yet even this would not be an inconsequential doctrinal step—
the creation of a federal duty to use uniform precise criteria in a recount.” Id. at 42. 
 75. Id. at 60. For a critique of Posner’s argument in favor of the result in Bush v. 
Gore, see Richard L. Hasen, A “Tincture of Justice”: Judge Posner’s Failed Rehabilitation of 
Bush v. Gore, 80 TEX. L. REV. 137 (2001). 
 76. Posner, supra note 26, at 46.  
 77. Charles Fried, A Badly Flawed Election: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 
22, 2001, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14004.  
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to fill Supreme Court vacancies.78 An opinion whose holding is lim-
ited to the facts of the case will lead to further claims that the Court 
decided the case using the not-so-venerable principle of constitu-
tional interpretation: “Bush wins.” To blunt that criticism, the Court 
may tolerate giving the opinion some precedential value. I turn now 
to that possibility. 
III.   TAKING BUSH V. GORE’S EQUAL PROTECTION                          
HOLDING SERIOUSLY 
 As Professor Jack Balkin of Yale Law School observed shortly af-
ter the Court decided Bush v. Gore, a rule applied only to one case 
“isn’t consistent with rule-of-law principles.”79 To be consistent with 
such principles, like cases are to be treated alike. This Part examines 
which cases are “like cases” compared to Bush v. Gore. This is not a 
futile exercise even if I am correct in Part II that the Supreme Court 
ultimately will limit Bush v. Gore to its facts. Lower courts will first 
apply Bush v. Gore as precedent to cases coming before it, and the 
Supreme Court might decline to review some of those cases. So there 
is at least a window of time in which the case may serve as valid 
precedent. 
 To make a determination of which cases are “like cases,” I begin 
by restating the holding of the case as briefly as I can. The Court 
held that “[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the 
State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one 
person’s vote over that of another.”80 Florida violated this rule by: (1) 
failing to formulate uniform rules for judging the “intent of the voter” 
in a manual recount; (2) ordering only a selective recount of “under-
votes” rather than a recount of all votes; (3) leaving open the possibil-
ity of certifying vote totals from incomplete recounts; and (4) failing 
to specify who would count the ballots or the procedures for objection. 
 This holding moves equal protection analysis in election law cases 
to a third level of equality. Various amendments to the Constitution 
and Supreme Court cases decided by the Warren Court established 
the first level of equality, requiring that if a jurisdiction holds an 
election, every citizen, adult resident has the right to vote in that 
                                                                                                                    
 78. See Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001. Jon 
Elster refers to the “civilizing force of hypocrisy,” which in this case could lead the Court to 
grant more precedential value to the case than first planned. Jon Elster, Introduction to 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 12 (Jon Elster ed., 1998). 
 79. Marcia Coyle, Gauging ‘Bush v. Gore’ Fallout: Will Equal Protection Language 
Open a Can of Electoral Worms?, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 25, 2000, at A4 (quoting Professor 
Balkin). 
 80. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000). 
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election.81 The Warren Court in Reynolds and its progeny, relying 
upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, es-
tablished the second level of equality—the right to an equally 
weighted vote.82 In Bush v. Gore, the Court relied upon the Reynolds 
line of cases to move to a third level of equality—equality in the pro-
cedures and mechanisms used for voting. 
 The Bush v. Gore Court did not explain which kinds of procedures 
and mechanisms used for voting constitute “arbitrary and disparate 
treatment” that “value one person’s vote over another” in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the most we can do is look 
at the four ways in which the Court held that Florida did so and 
compare those ways to factual allegations in new cases.83 
 Thus, consider which, if any, of the following five hypothetical al-
legations should be cognizable as an equal protection violation: 
 1. In the state of Pacifica, voters in some counties vote using 
punch card voting systems in which they must vote by punching out 
a chad with a stylus. Voters in other counties vote using optical 
scanning systems in which they must vote by filling in a bubble with 
a pencil. The rate at which punch card votes are rejected by vote 
tabulating equipment is almost 4% compared to an approximately 
1.5% rate for rejection of ballots read by optical scanning equip-
ment.84 Optical scanning equipment is more expensive, and perhaps 
for that reason it has been adopted in counties with higher per capita 
incomes.85 
                                                                                                                    
 81. See generally LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 1, ch. 3; ISSACHAROFF ET AL., su-
pra note 1, at 304 (referring to Harper as a “first generation” voting rights claim). 
 82. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 1, ch. 4; ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 1, at 
303-05 (discussing Harper, Reynolds, and Bush v. Gore). The latter source’s authors call 
cases dealing with statutory design of democratic institutions “second generation” cases, a 
different meaning than my “second level” term. Id. at 304. 
 83. The opacity of the Court’s equal protection holding may be the best thing about 
the opinion because it gives lower courts a chance to experiment with the new equal pro-
tection holding. I explain this point more fully in Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of Judi-
cially Unmanageable Standards in Election Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 
N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).     
 84.  
 The percentage of nonvotes in [Florida’s 2000 presidential] election in coun-
ties using a punch-card system was 3.92%; in contrast, the rate of error under 
the more modern optical scan systems was only 1.43%. Put in other terms, for 
every 10,000 votes cast, punch-card systems result in 250 more nonvotes than 
optical-scan systems. 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 126 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). In the wake of 
the Florida controversy, a number of empirical studies have examined rates of undervotes 
across different voting mechanisms. One of the most thorough studies has been conducted 
by the Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project. The study concluded that “[p]unch cards     
. . . lose at least 50 percent more votes than optically scanned paper ballots.” CALTECH-MIT 
VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, VOTING: WHAT IS, WHAT COULD BE 21 (July 2001). 
 85. At least five lawsuits have been filed in light of Bush v. Gore alleging that such 
differences constitute a denial of equal protection. See Compl. for Injunctive and Declara-
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 2. Same facts as in the first example, but the systems differ across 
states voting in a presidential election. 
 3. Two candidates in a local election in the state of Pacifica com-
pete for the job of county dogcatcher. Smith defeats Jones by ten 
votes in an election using a punch card voting system. Jones de-
mands a recount, which is conducted by hand using the state-
mandated “intent of the voter” standard. The state statute provides 
no further guidance on how to judge intent. Under the recount, Jones 
wins by three votes. Smith, and voters supporting Smith, sue to have 
the results overturned. 
 4. State voting officials “purge” from their voter rolls the names of 
voters who have not voted in the last two elections. Officials claim 
that they are doing so to prevent fraud—a number of names removed 
are of people who the state said, incorrectly, were convicted felons 
who have lost the right to vote—but plaintiffs claim the purpose is to 
remove as many African-American voters as possible. Alternatively, 
plaintiffs claim the purge law has a disparate impact on African-
American voters.86 
 5. In an effort to make it easier for elderly voters to see the ballot 
and vote effectively, county election officials design a ballot using a 
“butterfly ballot” design. In this design, the place for voters to record 
votes is along the center spine of the ballot. Voters allege after voting 
that they were confused by the ballot design, leading many of them 
to vote for a third-party candidate for an elective office rather than 
for their preferred candidate. Statistics unambiguously show that 
there is virtually no chance that this third-party candidate simply 
received proportionally more votes in this county than in other coun-
ties in the state.87 Voters in other counties in the state did not use 
the butterfly ballot. 
                                                                                                                    
tory Relief at 19, Common Cause v. Jones, No. 01-03470-SVW (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 17, 
2001), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/Complaint.aclu.sc.pdf; Class Action 
Compl. at 13-15, NAACP v. Harris, No. 01-CIV-120-GOLD (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 10, 2001), 
available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/11001harris.pdf; Compl. at 1-2, 9-10, Black v. 
McGuffage, No. 01C-0000208 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 11, 2001), available at 
http://election2000.stanford.edu/Illinois.aclu.pdf; Class Action Compl. for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief at 40, Wirth v. Election Sys. Software, Inc., No. 01-MR-6 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed 
Jan. 9, 2001), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/votomaticil.pdf; Compl. at 1, 6, 
Andrews v. Cox, No. 01-CZ-32490 (Ga. Fulton County Ct. filed Jan. 5, 2001), available at 
http://election2000.stanford.edu/aclu.cox.pdf. For a summary of these cases through Sep-
tember 2001, see B.J. Palermo, Bush-Gore Lives On, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 17, 2001, at A1.  
 86. For an example of such a lawsuit, see Class Action Compl. at 18-22, NAACP v. 
Harris, No. 01-CIV-120-GOLD (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 10, 2001), available at http://elec-
tion2000.stanford.edu/11001harris.pdf. 
 87. On the statistics related to overvoting, voting for Reform Party candidate Pat Bu-
chanan, and the butterfly ballot used in Palm Beach County, Florida, during the disputed 
election, see Henry E. Brady, Report on Voting and Ballot Form in Palm Beach County 
(Nov. 16, 2000), at http://elections.fas.harvard.edu/statement/hbrady/hbrady.pdf; see also 
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 Each of these five examples present fact patterns with both simi-
larities to and differences from the facts of Bush v. Gore. The ques-
tion is which similarities and differences should matter legally. In 
other words, which cases are sufficiently “like” Bush v. Gore so that 
Bush v. Gore should be precedent? 
 In the first hypothetical, there is little question that the use of dif-
ferent voting systems with different error rates treats voters differ-
ently and makes it less likely that voters in punch card districts will 
cast votes that count. Voters in counties using optical scanning 
equipment have a much better chance of having their votes counted 
than those in counties using a punch card ballot system. The dispa-
rate treatment is all the more disturbing to the extent that it corre-
lates with wealth,88 looking functionally like the poll tax the Court 
struck down in Harper. Under strict scrutiny, this disparate treat-
ment in the counting of votes appears just as “dilutive” of the right to 
vote and just as “arbitrary” as the different methods of recounting 
votes struck down in Bush v. Gore. There is no compelling interest 
for the different treatment; a decision about resource allocation by lo-
calities should not be able to trump a “fundamental right.” 
 Furthermore, it appears irrelevant that the choice of voting ma-
chine technology was not the product of intentional discrimination or 
animus against any voters or groups of voters. In Harper, the Court 
held that a poll tax is unconstitutional even absent evidence that its 
intent was to discriminate against voters on the basis of race or 
wealth. In Bush v. Gore, the Court did not base its holding on inten-
tional discrimination by Florida officials (or the Florida Supreme 
Court). In sum, if Bush v. Gore indeed has precedential value, it 
clearly should apply to prevent the use of these different voting sys-
tems in the same election.89 Different voting systems function in the 
same discriminatory manner as different means to count votes in a 
manual recount. 
 The result of this case might be different if a court applied only a 
rational basis standard to the different procedures. The decision of 
which voting systems to use appears to be a resource allocation deci-
                                                                                                                    
Don Van Natta, Counting the Vote: The Ballot; Gore Lawyers Focus on Ballot in Palm 
Beach County, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at A29. 
 88. In fact, as an empirical matter, it appears (counterintuitively) that wealthier ar-
eas are somewhat more likely to use punch card ballots than poorer areas. See E-mail from 
Professor Stephen Ansolabehere, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, to author (Oct. 10, 2001) (on file with the Florida State University Law Re-
view) (finding this statistical relationship but noting that it may not be statistically signifi-
cant when the model controls for other variables).   
 89. Under this reasoning, one may rightly question whether McDonald v. Board of 
Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), remains good law. In McDonald, the Court 
held that a state need not provide for absentee voting at all, and if it does so the state need 
not provide it for all voters. 
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sion that a court could deem a legitimate one. Nonetheless, Bush v. 
Gore appears to mandate strict scrutiny, not application of rational 
basis review.90 
 The second hypothetical is more complex. The first hypothetical 
establishes that the Equal Protection Clause affords a right to juris-
diction-wide uniformity in the methods for conducting elections. In a 
presidential election, the jurisdiction is the entire nation. The need 
for uniformity itself is echoed in the Constitution, which requires a 
uniform day for choosing presidential electors.91 On the other hand, 
each state picks its own electors for the Electoral College, so equality 
in the weighting of votes across states is affirmatively rejected in the 
Constitution. Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause by its own 
terms provides that “no state shall” deny equal protection of the 
laws; in differences across states, perhaps the Clause is not even im-
plicated.92 Thus, a textual constitutional argument might allow treat-
ing the second hypothetical differently. 
 The third hypothetical appears the easiest to resolve under Bush 
v. Gore. In its equal protection analysis, the Court spent most of its 
time explaining its view that the Florida Supreme Court’s failure to 
further define the “intent of the voter” standard violated equal pro-
tection.93 Justice Stevens, in dissent, pointed out that numerous 
states used such a standard or its equivalent in setting forth the 
standards for manual recounts.94 The majority did nothing to suggest 
that Florida law on this point was unique in some way. It is difficult 
to see how any of these standards survive Bush v. Gore. But, as ex-
plained below, a court’s finding that the standard violates the Consti-
tution does not require that the election results be overturned.95 
 The fourth hypothetical is easy to resolve if plaintiffs can prove in-
tentional discrimination. In that case, plaintiffs do not need Bush v. 
Gore to make the equal protection claim. Preexisting case law estab-
lished that purposeful race discrimination in voting is unconstitu-
tional.96 Where Bush v. Gore might be helpful is in getting around 
Bolden’s holding that disparate racial impact of an electoral struc-
ture (like the failure to use districting to elect members of a city 
commission) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Since it is 
often difficult to meet Bolden’s discriminatory intent requirement, to 
the extent that plaintiffs can recast their case as a Bush v. Gore 
claim—one involving “arbitrary and disparate treatment” that 
                                                                                                                    
 90. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.  
 92. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 93. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000). 
 94. Id. at 125 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 95. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.  
 96. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65-70 (1980). 
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“value[s] one person’s vote over that of another” in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause—perhaps their claim will fare better.97 
 The fifth and final hypothetical presents the most difficult issue, 
but one that should still be considered a violation of equal protection. 
On the one hand, the case fits comfortably into the holding of Bush v. 
Gore and the other hypothetical cases: voters are being treated dif-
ferently depending upon the county in which they live. Imagine if 
voters in one county could walk right up to the polls, but voters in 
another county had to walk up a steep hill to get to the polls. The 
confusing ballot is like the steep hill, and it should not matter that 
election officials picked the hill because they thought it would be a 
good place to vote without distractions. 
 On the other hand, the plaintiff’s voting complaint may stem less 
from state action (as in the manual recount case where state officials 
count the votes) than from the capabilities of different voters. In 
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,98 the Court held 
that fairly applied literacy tests are constitutional.99 This holding is 
of questionable value following cases like Harper100 and Kramer v. 
Union Free School District No. 15.101 But if Lassiter remains good 
law, it stands for the proposition that the state can condition the 
franchise on voters’ ability to follow instructions—thereby ensuring 
that only educated voters vote.102 
 I find this argument unpersuasive, and not only because I reject 
Lassiter as misconstruing the nature of voting as an exercise in effi-
cient decisionmaking rather than an allocation of political power 
among co-equal citizens. In the butterfly ballot hypothetical, the 
state did not design the ballot in one county to “test” elderly citizens’ 
ability to vote. The ballot more likely tested their ability to see, and 
no one will claim blindness as a valid reason to deny the vote. More-
over, accepting the legitimacy of such a test, why conduct the test 
only in one county? Finally, the result of a literacy test as in Lassiter 
is to prevent or hinder illiterate voters from voting. The result of the 
butterfly ballot apparently is to cause voters to vote for candidates 
they do not prefer. Surely the state cannot have a legitimate, much 
                                                                                                                    
 97. On the relationship of Bush v. Gore to Mobile v. Bolden, see infra Part IV.C.1. 
 98. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 99. Id. at 53-54. Such tests are now banned by the Voting Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 
1973aa (1994). 
 100. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 101. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). On why Lassiter may not survive Kramer, see ISSACHAROFF 
ET AL., supra note 1, at 58. 
 102. See Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51-52 (“The ability to read and write likewise has some 
relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot. . . . [I]n our society 
where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter canvass and debate cam-
paign issues, a State might conclude that only those who are literate should exercise the 
franchise.”). 
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less compelling, interest in that. On balance, this looks like a case to 
which the precedent of Bush v. Gore should apply. 
 With that conclusion, a word here is in order about remedies. 
There may be a difference between a challenge to a voting procedure 
or election mechanism before an election takes place and a post-
election challenge seeking to throw out the results of a vote or re-
count or to demand a revote. Even if each of these five hypothetical 
lawsuits presents violations of the Equal Protection Clause, the ap-
propriate remedy may not be to void an election or the results of a re-
count or to require a revote.103 Courts may be uncomfortable with 
remedies that overturn elections. In the third hypothetical, for ex-
ample, a court could rule that the recount violates equal protection 
but that Smith’s claim is barred by laches: she should have sought an 
injunction preventing the manual recounting of the votes under ex-
isting state law. In the actual butterfly ballot case, the trial court 
ruled that a revote in Palm Beach County alone would violate the 
Constitution’s requirement of a uniform election day for presidential 
electors.104 Thus, if Bush v. Gore has any precedential value at all, it 
may have such value primarily when used prospectively to change 
election practices. 
IV.   THE BENEFITS, COSTS, AND LIMITS OF THE NEW EQUAL 
PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE OF BUSH V. GORE 
 In Part II, I set forth my suspicions that Bush v. Gore ultimately 
will have little precedential value. In Part III, I explored the prece-
dential value the case likely would have if the Supreme Court took 
its holding seriously. In this final Part, I consider the benefits of 
Bush v. Gore’s ostensible extension of equal protection jurisprudence 
in elections to the third level of equality, the costs of the extension, 
and the implications of the extension for other, broader equal protec-
tion claims in elections. 
                                                                                                                    
 103. On the variety of potential remedies, see ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 1, ch. 12 
(listing as potential remedies for defective elections: ordering a new election, enjoining an 
upcoming election, adjusting the vote totals, permanently enjoining a particular election 
practice, damages, and criminal prosecution). 
 104. The trial court held that a revote could not be ordered in a presidential election 
because it would violate, among other things, the Constitution’s provision of a uniform day 
for the choosing of presidential electors. See Order on Plaintiff’s Compl. for Declaratory, In-
junctive, and Other Relief Arising from Plaintiffs’ Claims of Massive Voter Confusion Re-
sulting from the Use of a “Butterfly” Type Ballot during the Election Held on Nov. 7, 2000, 
Fladell v. Elections Canvassing Comm’n of Fla., No. CL 00-10965 AB (Nov. 20, 2000), 
available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/fladell1120.pdf. The Florida Supreme Court 
did not reach the issue of remedy, finding that the ballot was in substantial compliance 
with Florida law. Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240, 1242 
(Fla. 2000). 
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A.   Benefits 
 The benefits of a precedent requiring scrupulous equality in the 
procedures and mechanics of elections are fairly obvious: such a 
precedent will increase resources used to conduct elections, so that at 
least twentieth century voting technology will be applied as we enter 
the twenty-first century. It will provide a means for those in poor, 
urban areas to have just as accurate a voting system as those used in 
wealthier areas. It will also likely ensure more reliable vote counting. 
 Before the Florida debacle, state and local governments had little 
incentive to invest in better voting technology or to reconsider the 
fairness of their laws regulating the contesting of elections. In an era 
of tight government budgets, an argument to upgrade from punch 
card technology to optical scanner equipment had to compete with 
arguments to pay teachers more, to devote more money to crime pre-
vention, or to return money to taxpayers. Bush v. Gore provides legal 
cover—if not a legal mandate—for expending resources to upgrade 
voting; prudent municipal attorneys would well advise their clients 
that failure to invest in better election processes will invite litigation. 
No one wants to be “the next Florida.” By increasing the salience of 
these issues, Bush v. Gore may have the salutary effect of causing 
governments to pay attention to these issues and devote resources 
toward solving voting problems, even if the case ultimately holds lit-
tle or no precedential value. 
B.   Costs 
 Expanding political equality to the third level, as Bush v. Gore 
may have done, is a mixed blessing. Obviously, the costs associated 
with upgrading voting equipment, rewriting state and local election 
laws involving contested elections, and litigation over both types of 
changes will be considerable. One estimate to upgrade voting equip-
ment ranged as high as $9 billion nationally.105 These are real costs, 
and obviously in a time of limited budgets such spending takes 
money away from teacher raises, better police protection, or tax re-
duction. But we can chalk up the $9 billion to the cost of having a 
democracy that takes seriously the mandate to ensure that all votes 
are counted and counted fairly. I focus here on three other concerns 
arising from extending equal protection jurisprudence to the nuts-
and-bolts of elections—concerns that go to whether extension to the 
third level of political equality necessarily furthers democratic val-
ues. 
                                                                                                                    
 105. Alan C. Miller & Nick Anderson, America Waits: Voting Reforms Join Race for 
Funding, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at A1; see also Jim Drinkard, Updating Voting Ma-
chines Could Take Nation a Decade, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2001, at 1 (noting that Congress 
“may pour up to $2.5 billion into upgrades” of voting equipment). 
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 First, third-level claims provide more reasons, and in some cases a 
pretext, for courts to nullify election results. The courts’ further entry 
into the political thicket thus threatens both democracy and the le-
gitimacy of courts, whose integrity may be questioned even when a 
court justifiably nullifies an election on equal protection grounds. In 
Bell v. Southwell,106 the Fifth Circuit courageously voided the results 
of a local election in which African-American voters were intimidated 
from voting in voting booths segregated by race and gender. The 
court voided the results even while recognizing the power to do so as 
“[d]rastic, if not staggering.”107 As correct as Bell was, court interven-
tion should be used sparingly. Bush v. Gore is a dangerous precedent 
to the extent that it eases the way for federal court intervention in 
state and local elections over nuts-and-bolts disputes better left to lo-
cal authorities. 
 Second, third-level claims undermine federalism in a way that 
first- and second-level equal protection claims do not. Claims of local 
control over nuts-and-bolts voting mechanisms resonate more genu-
inely than claims of localities to deny the franchise to certain groups 
of individuals or to count votes unevenly. 
 The Court rightly observed long ago that the right to vote is fun-
damental because it is “preservative of all [other] rights.”108 Politi-
cians are less likely to be responsive to a group of citizens who cannot 
vote. Moreover, legislatures are constructed to respond to demands of 
a group of legislators in proportion to the group’s power in the legis-
lature, rather than in proportion to the number of people the group of 
legislators represents; that is the essence of the vote dilution claim in 
Reynolds v. Sims.109 Thus, first- and second-level political equality 
claims allow courts to solve political market failures. 
 A similar political market failure does not exist with respect to 
most nuts-and-bolts election issues.110 Consider again the issue of 
punch card systems versus optical scanners. Although it is true that 
punch card voters will be marginally more likely not to have their 
votes counted compared to those using optically scanned ballots, that 
difference will not neatly translate into a loss of political strength. 
Legislators elected from districts in which the punch card ballots are 
used will represent the same number of voters as those legislators 
from other districts, and politicians cannot ignore the wishes of those 
whose votes do not count because nobody knows who these people 
are. Thus, it is more likely that a nuts-and-bolts problem like the op-
                                                                                                                    
 106. 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967). 
 107. Id. at 662. 
 108. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
 109. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 110. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Court Casts Its Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at 
A31. 
2001]            EQUAL PROTECTION’S FUTURE IN ELECTIONS 401 
 
tical scanning problem may be solved politically, if the voters and 
legislators in districts using the system make it a priority on the lo-
cal or state level. The political process will not always work, however, 
to the extent the poor lack political power in the legislature gener-
ally—they may lack the power to get voting changes enacted as well. 
 Not only is the case for court intervention weaker for third-level 
claims than for first- and second-level claims, but the state and local 
interests in local variations are also on stronger moral grounds. At 
least under political theories currently accepted by the Supreme 
Court, any state interest in deviating from roughly equipopulous dis-
tricts is illegitimate, as is any state interest in denying the franchise 
to some group of citizen adult residents. On the other hand, the state 
may have a good reason unrelated to voting for at least some varia-
tions in the nuts-and-bolts of elections. Bush v. Gore is tantamount to 
a holding that the purchase of ambulances by a relatively poor 
county is less important than a move from punch cards to optical 
scanners. That may be a valid trade-off to make, but note that it is 
being made on the federal level for all jurisdictions by unelected fed-
eral judges. 
 The third and final cost of accepting third-level equality claims is 
the disincentive the claims create for jurisdictions to experiment with 
new methods of voting. Oregon has adopted vote-by-mail, and juris-
dictions are considering internet voting.111 How do these new meth-
ods get adopted in one jurisdiction alone, at least in presidential elec-
tions, following Bush v. Gore?112 California, for example, has wisely 
chosen to explore a move to internet voting slowly through a number 
of discrete steps with evaluations conducted after each step.113 As 
part of that experimentation, “touch-screen voting,” much like voting 
with an ATM screen, was used in Riverside County, California, as a 
pilot project in the 2000 general election.114 It seems far from frivo-
lous to argue that, depending upon the error rates of such systems or 
other factors, either the voters of Riverside County or, alternatively, 
voters outside Riverside County have suffered discrimination under 
Bush v. Gore by the countywide experiment in an election for state 
and national office. Now perhaps the state has an important, indeed 
compelling, interest in conducting such tests. (Or perhaps not; could 
these tests be done in nonbinding elections or elections featuring only 
                                                                                                                    
 111. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Introduction to Symposium, Internet Voting and 
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 112. See supra Part III (discussing hypothetical 2). 
 113. CALIFORNIA INTERNET VOTING TASK FORCE, A REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF 
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candidates for local office?) But if the state knows it will face litiga-
tion for such experimentation, it will be wary of engaging in it. Thus, 
Bush v. Gore could have the unintended effect of freezing our voting 
mechanics at the current level of technology. That means that all 
voters may suffer as more accurate voting technology emerges. 
C.   Beyond Third-Level Equality Claims 
 Finally, it is worth thinking about the doctrinal implications of ex-
tending equal protection jurisprudence to the third level. It is unclear 
whether extension of equal protection jurisprudence to the third level 
differs meaningfully from arguments calling for greater political 
equality in terms of electoral structures and financing election cam-
paigns. In other words, the Court in Bush v. Gore set the precedent of 
moving to a more intrusive and comprehensive view of political 
equality in terms of the nuts-and-bolts of elections without much dis-
cussion or defense of the move. Bush v. Gore can therefore serve to 
justify an analogous move by a future, more liberal Supreme Court 
toward a more intrusive and comprehensive view of political equality 
in other areas. My claim is not that such moves would flow from the 
holding of Bush v. Gore itself. The case’s holding is no doubt distin-
guishable from the equal protection claims discussed below. Rather, 
the applicable precedent here is the means by which Bush v. Gore 
adopted a new level of political equality. 
1.   Equality of “Electoral Structures” 
 Consider first political equality in the means of aggregating votes. 
In Mobile v. Bolden,115 African-American residents of the city of Mo-
bile, Alabama, brought a class action lawsuit challenging the consti-
tutionality of the city’s at-large method of electing its three city 
commissioners under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and under the Fifteenth Amendment.116 The evidence 
showed that African-American voters made up about one-third of the 
Mobile electorate, but given the persistence of severe voting along ra-
cial lines and the use of at-large voting rather than single-member 
districts, no African-American-preferred candidate had ever been 
elected commissioner or was likely to be elected commissioner in the 
foreseeable future.117 Had voting taken place using single-member 
districts rather than at-large, African-American voters would have 
had a better chance to elect a candidate of their choice or at least to 
exert greater political influence.118 
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 The Court rejected the argument that the at-large method vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.119 
A four-Justice plurality stated that the plaintiffs’ claim failed be-
cause the plaintiffs lacked evidence that the electoral system was de-
signed with a racially discriminatory purpose.120 Justice Blackmun 
concurred in the result on grounds that the relief afforded by the 
trial court “was not commensurate with the sound exercise of judicial 
discretion.”121 Justice Stevens concurred essentially on grounds that 
a contrary ruling would be impossible to administer.122 
 Three Justices dissented. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice 
Brennan, relied explicitly on Reynolds123 in arguing that the at-large 
system constituted a denial of equal protection: 
 Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny focused solely on the discrimi-
natory effects of malapportionment. They recognize that, when 
population figures for the representational districts of a legislature 
are not similar, the votes of citizens in larger districts do not carry 
as much weight in the legislature as do votes cast by citizens in 
smaller districts. The equal protection problem attacked by the 
“one person, one vote” principle is, then, one of vote dilution: under 
Reynolds, each citizen must have an “equally effective voice” in the 
election of representatives. In the present cases, the alleged vote 
dilution, though caused by the combined effects of the electoral 
structure and social and historical factors, rather than by unequal 
population distribution is analytically the same concept: the unjus-
tified abridgement of a fundamental right. It follows, then, that a 
showing of discriminatory intent is just as unnecessary under the 
vote-dilution approach . . . as it is under our reapportionment 
cases.124 
 The plurality rejected Justice Marshall’s reliance on Reynolds, 
seeing Marshall’s position as an endorsement of proportional repre-
sentation and thus “not the law. The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representation 
as an imperative of political organization.”125 
                                                                                                                    
 119. Id. at 65-70. The Court also rejected the Fifteenth Amendment claim, but I focus 
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 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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 Regardless of whether Justice Marshall’s position should properly 
be characterized as an endorsement of proportional representation,126 
it seems no more a stretch to extend the equal protection analysis of 
Reynolds to the means of aggregating votes (what Marshall refers to 
as “electoral structures”) than to the mechanics of voting. In other 
words, the principle of promoting political equality has no “natural” 
stopping point, even if we can draw distinctions among the cases. 
 Congress essentially codified Justice Marshall’s position in Bolden 
through an amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 
1982.127 Thus, there has been no need for the Court to revisit the con-
stitutional question. However, if Congress were to repeal the Voting 
Rights Act or the current Court majority were to hold it unconstitu-
tional,128 the constitutional question could arise again. A future lib-
eral Supreme Court could reverse Bolden, citing no more than Rey-
nolds and Bush v. Gore’s holding that “[h]aving once granted the 
right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary 
and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of an-
other.”129 The argument would be simply that at-large voting, much 
more so than counting undervotes but not overvotes, values one per-
son’s vote over that of another. 
2.   Equality of Campaign Finance 
 In Buckley v. Valeo,130 as mentioned above,131 the Court considered 
the constitutionality of a law limiting the amount individuals could 
spend supporting or opposing candidates for federal office. Plaintiffs 
argued that the law violated their rights under the First Amendment 
to freedom of speech and association, while the government defended 
the regulation in a number of ways.132 
 One argument the government raised was that the law was justi-
fied by an interest in promoting political equality.133 The Court re-
jected the argument: 
 It is argued, however, that the ancillary governmental interest 
in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influ-
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ence the outcome of elections serves to justify the limitation on ex-
press advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates imposed by 
[the statute’s] expenditure ceiling. But the concept that govern-
ment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in or-
der to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment, which was designed “to secure the widest possi-
ble dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources,” and “to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
ple.”134 
 Liberal scholars have sharply attacked the Buckley Court’s rejec-
tion of political equality as a compelling interest.135 One criticism has 
specifically tied the equality interest to equal protection analysis. In 
a pair of articles predating Bush v. Gore, Professor Jamin Raskin and 
attorney John Bonifaz argued that Reynolds requires that candidates 
for election receive equal public financing. They argue that “[i]n 
market societies where wealth is unevenly distributed yet crucial to 
the processes of election and governance, the inegalitarian logic of 
the economy undermines the egalitarian logic of one person, one vote 
democracy.”136 The authors explicitly argue that a constitutional re-
quirement mandating equality in campaign finances follows from 
earlier Supreme Court equal protection precedents striking down 
“grandfather clauses, exclusionary white primaries, state poll taxes, 
restrictions on the suffrage rights of citizens in the armed services, 
unnecessarily long residency requirements, excessively high candi-
date filing fees, and malapportioned legislative districts that dilute 
the potency of the vote.”137 
 No doubt, Raskin and Bonifaz can now add Bush v. Gore to their 
list of precedents creating greater political equality in elections. If 
“the State may not . . . value one person’s vote over that of another”138 
in how it counts votes, it similarly should not sanction the use of pri-
vate wealth to influence the outcome of an election in a way that val-
ues one person’s vote over that of another. As with reversal of 
Bolden, the conservative Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore has set the 
precedent for a future liberal Supreme Court to embrace Raskin and 
Bonifaz’s novel equal protection analysis. 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
 Whether a future Supreme Court should reverse course from ei-
ther Bolden or Buckley is a large topic well beyond the scope of this 
paper. My point is only that the equality principle is difficult to 
cabin. Whether or not Reynolds, Harper, and Bush v. Gore were cor-
rect or incorrect decisions, they inevitably flow from the Justices’ 
views of how much (and what kinds of) equality the Constitution 
should mandate, and what is better left to state variation and the po-
litical processes. As times and Court personnel change, such views on 
equality, and therefore the law of equal protection in elections, will 
likely change as well. 
 To the extent Bush v. Gore paves the way toward constitutional 
challenges of electoral structures and campaign finance reform, it 
may be a good development to at least some observers. It certainly 
would not be a development intended by at least some of the five Jus-
tices in the Bush v. Gore majority.139 That would just add to the list of 
ironies that the Florida controversy has wrought, and, perhaps for 
those who are disappointed by the Court in Bush v. Gore, create a 
sense of “rough justice” as well. 
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